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THE NATIONAL PERMIT PROGRAM: A POLLUTER'S BRIDGE
OVER TROUBLED WATERS?
JOHN T. BERNBOM*
INTRODUCTION
On October 18, 1972, over President Nixon's veto,' Congress en-
acted the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972,2
"to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation's waters."3 The 1972 Amendments state that
by July 1, 1983, water quality shall be such as to provide for the
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife and to
provide recreation in and on the water. Additionally, it is declared
to be a national goal to achieve zero discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters by 1985.1 To attain these laudable goals, the 1972
Amendments changed and revitalized the assault on water pollu-
tion. They provide new enforcement tools, increased federal funding
for upgrading publicly owned waste treatment facilities and in-
creased federal funding for water pollution research. The 1972
Amendments also provide for a comprehensive waste discharge per-
mit program. This permit program and its implications will be dis-
cussed in this article; in particular, the impact and consequences of
holding a permit will be examined.
PERMITS UNDER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
The permit system established by the Amendments is called the
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Section; J. D. 1971, the John Marshall Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Deborah Senn, a senior law student
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Environmental Protection Agency.
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1. Message from the President of the United States Returning without Approval of the
Bill (S.2770) Entitled "The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972."
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. [hereinafter also referred to as the 1972 Amendments or the
Amendments]. Throughout the text, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 will be referred to as the 1972 Amendments, or the Amendments. The various sections
referred to in the text correspond to the section number of Pub. L. 92-500. The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq., was initially enacted in 1948 and was the
subject of numerous amendments of which the 1972 Amendments were the most significant
and comprehensive.
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(Supp. II, 1972).
4. Id. § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
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National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).5 The
discharge of any pollutant by any person without a permit or in
violation of any condition of a permit is unlawful.' The Amend-
ments provide for both criminal and civil enforcement actions. If a
person willfully or negligently violates a permit requirement, a fine
of not less than $2500 nor more than $25,000 per day may be as-
sessed upon the first conviction. A fine of not more than $50,000 per
day may be assessed upon the second conviction. Additionally, im-
prisonment for not more than one year may be imposed for a first
conviction and imprisonment for not more than two years for a
second conviction.' Further, there is a civil penalty of up to $10,000
per day.'
Federal waste discharge permit programs are not new9 and state
permit programs are common. 0 It is the strict penalties coupled
with the comprehensive scope of the NPDES program which distin-
guishes it from other permit systems. Initially, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is to administer the
NPDES program and issue the permits in each state. Prior to the
issuance of a permit by the USEPA, the state in which the dischar-
ger is located must certify that the permit will meet applicable state
standards." Eventually, each state is expected to administer its own
program subject to certain federal limitations.2 An NPDES permit
is required for the discharge of pollutants from point sources into
navigable waters. 3 In view of this broad requirement, it would be
5. Id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972).
6. Id. § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 11, 1972).
7. Id. § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
8. Id. § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (Supp. II, 1972). Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, Act
of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152, commonly known as the Refuse Act, provided
for federal waste discharge permits. Applicability of the Refuse Act will be discussed at text
accompanying notes 20 through 45 infra.
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1012 (1973).
11. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1341(a)(1) (Supp. H, 1972).
12. Many states had adopted standards prior to the enactment of the 1972 Amendments
which, in many instances, are more stringent than federal standards. In states without pre-
existing standards, the federally promulgated standards became the applicable state stan-
dards.
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 §§ 402 and 405, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342 and 1345 (Supp. II, 1972). "Point source" is defined in section 502(14) of the
Amendments as
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.
Pursuant to authority provided in sections 402 and 405 of the Amendments, the USEPA
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rare for an attorney with commercial clients not to encounter
NPDES related problems. Each NPDES permit will impose certain
conditions designed to meet the goals of the Amendments. Such
conditions may include monitoring to measure the quality and
quantity of pollutants discharged, record keeping, reporting, com-
pliance scheduling, specific limitations on the pollutants dis-
charged, and specific limitations of pollutant impact on the receiv-
ing waterway.
A significant distinction between the Amendments and prior fed-
eral water pollution legislation is that emphasis is placed upon ef-
fluent limitations rather than water quality standards. Under prior
legislation, limitations were established in order to achieve particu-
lar water quality standards. Water quality relates to the condition
and resulting usage of a body of water. Effluent means any waste
water discharged to a waterway. Under the Amendments, improved
water quality is clearly the goal, however, the achievement of the
goal is accomplished by limiting the quantity and concentrations of
promulgated policies and procedures for the administration of NPDES, 40 C.F.R. § 125 et
seq. The regulations exempted certain point sources from NPDES requirements. These in-
cluded discharges from storm sewers composed entirely of storm runoff uncontaminated by
industrial or commercial activity; from relatively small animal confinement facilities; from
silvicultural activities; and certain irrigation return flow, 40 C.F.R. 125.4(f) and (j). These
exemptions were challenged by a citizen group, National Resources Defense Council v. Train,
7 E.R.C. 1881 (1975), on the basis that the exemptions diminished the overall effect of the
Amendments. The USEPA contended that the problems created by the exempted categories
are better dealt with absent a permit; that the exemption related only to a need for a permit
and not to substantive discharge requirements; and that to require permits for exempted
categories would render the permit program unworkable. The court found against the USEPA
based upon the required comprehensiveness of the NPDES permit program. The USEPA is
currently attempting to develop methods to bring the previously exempted point sources into
the permit program.
Section 502(7) of the Amendments provides that the term "navigable waters" includes
"waters of the United States including territorial seas." The USEPA has sought to give
greater certitude to the term, and defined it to include, 40 C.F.R. 125.1(p):
1. All navigable waters of the United States;
2. Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States;
3. Interstate waters;
4. Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by interstate travelers
for recreational or other purposes;
5. Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or shellfish are taken and
sold in interstate commerce; and
6. Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized for industrial purposes
by industries in interstate commerce.
Section 502(6) of the Amendments defines "pollutant" as "dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radio-active materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste
discharged into water."
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contaminants discharged by the establishment of effluent limita-
tions.
Enforcement of NPDES effluent standards is the heart of the
water pollution enforcement program. An enforcement action
against a permittee for violation of a procedural permit requirement
or for a pollutant discharge in excess of a permit limitation is de-
signed to be less cumbersome than a traditional nuisance action. All
that need be proved is that a particular permit requirement exists
and that the permittee failed to comply with such requirement.
General guidelines concerning pollutant limitations allowable in
an NPDES permit are provided in the Amendments. 4 The Amend-
ments take a three-step approach to accomplish the stated goals.
A) By no later than July 1, 1977:
1) Publically owned sewage treatment works must utilize sec-
ondary treatment;
2) Dischargers other than publically owned treatment works
must utilize the best practicable control technology currently
available;
3) All pollutant discharges must meet State laws, rules, or
regulations.
B) By no later than July 1, 1983:
1) Publically owned sewage treatment plants must utilize the
best practicable waste treatment technology;
2) Discharges other than publically owned treatment works
must utilize the best available technology economically
achievable.
C) Attainment of zero discharge by January 1, 1985.
By July 1, 1977, publicly-owned sewage treatment plants must
employ secondary treatment which is a treatment process beyond
mere liquid-solid separation. Such secondary treatment may in-
clude chemical additions and the use of microorganisms to break
down organic matter. Industry must employ the best practicable
control technology currently available (commonly known as BPT).
BPT is determined by computing the average of the best existing
performances by well operated plants within each industrial cate-
14. Id. § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. , 1972). The complexities and impact of the
discharge guidelines are beyond the scope of this article. A more complete discussion of this
subject may be found in, Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1972, 77 Dic. L. REv. 459 (1973). The United States Environmental Protection Agency
translated these guidelines into particular discharge limitations for certain classes of dischar-
gers pursuant to section 304 of the Amendments. The Amendments also require the establish-
ment of particular standards for new sources, Id. § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316, and for toxic and
pretreatment discharges, Id. § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317.
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gory. BPT as a standard is susceptible to criticism in that it only
considers the best existing performance, even though some dis-
charges are presently meeting the 1977 standards. Absent more
stringent preexisting state standards, BPT provides the basis for
final NPDES permit requirements. Further, by July 1, 1977, in-
dustrial dischargers to municipal sewer systems must meet pre-
treatment standards. Finally, effluent limitations may be imposed
by July 1, 1977, to achieve any other state requirements which are
more stringent than those required by the Amendments.
By July 1, 1983, publicly-owned sewage treatment works must
provide the best practicable method of waste treatment. Industrial
dischargers must employ the best available technology (commonly
known as BAT) economically achievable. Subsequent to July 1,
1983, efforts will be made to achieve the zero discharge goal by
January 1, 1985.
THE IMMUNITY ISSUE
As the NPDES program progresses, and the bulk of the permits
are issued, there is a question as to whether a permittee who is in
compliance with the terms and conditions of an NPDES permit
remains, nonetheless, subject to enforcement actions; or, whether
such compliance renders the permittee immune from all pollution-
related actions. The Amendments address the question of immunity
in section 402(k) and provide that:
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be
deemed compliance, for purposes of section 309 (Federal Enforce-
ment) and 505 (Citizen Suits), with sections 301, 302, 306, 307 and
403, except any standard imposed under section 307 for a toxic
pollutant injurious to human health. 5
Certain major sections of the Amendments which presumably
provide for non-permit related enforcement actions include sections
311 (Oil and Hazardous Substances Liability), 504 (Emergency
Powers), 510 (State Authority) and 511 (Other Affected Author-
ity). 6 Violations of any of these sections regardless of compliance
15. Id. § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k). The immunity of section 402(k) is apparently
contradicted by section 402(i) which provides that nothing in the section shall limit the
authority to take action under section 309 [Federal Enforcement]. A reasonable interpreta-
tion of section 402(i) is that it insures continued federal enforcement after the assumption of
State NPDES authority.
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(Supp. IT, 1972); Id. § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. II, 1972); Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370
(Supp. II, 1972); Id. § 511, 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. H, 1972).
19761
Loyola University Law Journal
with the terms of an NPDES permit may result in enforcement
liability. Actions arising out of oil and hazardous substances spills,
emergency actions necessitated by imminent endangerment to
health and safety, and actions brought pursuant to the Refuse Act
will be considered below.
Section 510 is the most significant section of the Amendments
relating to the subject of possible immunity of a permittee from
enforcement actions. Section 510 provides:
Except as expressly provded in this Act, nothing is in this Act
shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdi-
vision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any
standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B)
any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; ex-
cept that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent
standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-
formance is in effect under this Act, such State or political subdivi-
sion or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pre-
treatment standard, or standard of performance which is less strin-
gent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent stan-
dard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of perform-
ance under this Act; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with re-
spect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States. 7
This section specifically guarantees the right of any state and politi-
cal subdivision to adopt or enforce any pollutant discharge standard
or impose any compliance program if such standard or program is
more stringent than that required by the Act. Section 510 suggests
that the requirements of the Amendments represent the "bottom
line" in water pollution control. Thus, it may be argued that a state
can adopt, enforce and impose a compliance program based on stan-
dards more stringent than, and thus inconsistent with, NPDES re-
quirements. In light of this possibility, immunity under an NPDES
permit may be illusory; future state action inconsistent with
NPDES standards remains possible.
Certain states took the lead in environmental enforcement during
the 1960's. In response to citizen pressure, many states took steps
toward pollution abatement. It had been the policy of some states,
aided by citizen groups, to impose strict standards, to initiate en-
forcement strategies, to impose significant compliance programs,
and to levy substantial fines against polluters. These environmen-
17. Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. II, 1972).
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tally aggressive states may consider going beyond the enforcement
strategy dictated by NPDES permits, especially since some facili-
ties have already met 1977 and 1983 standards. Also, since NPDES
permits can be issued for up to five years,'" factors such as new
technology, population shifts and water usage changes may arise
which would render a permit obsolete.'9 The existence of an obsolete
permit, due to changed circumstances or possible drafting error,
coupled with citizen pressure to alleviate an environmental prob-
lem, is likely to result in state action against an NPDES permittee.
Beside potential state actions mentioned above, a polluter may
be held accountable under a federal statute, public trust doctrine,
or nuisance theory. The extent to which the issuance of a NPDES
permit will affect these actions, must be examined in the context
of each action. Some actions have been expressly preserved in the
Amendments, while the fate of other actions will be left to the
judicial interpretation of section 510.
REFUSE ACT
Of the enumerated actions which are specifically preserved in the
Amendments, an action brought under the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 189920 (more commonly known as the Refuse Act) is one of the
most noteworthy. Section 511(a)(2)(B) explicitly states that the
Amendments shall not impair the authority of the Secretary of the
Army under the Refuse Act.'
The Refuse Act was enacted in 1899 primarily to prevent obstruc-
tion of navigation in the nation's waterways. Section 13 of the Act
reads in part:
18. Id. § 402(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1) (Supp. 11, 1972).
19. Section 402(b)(1)(C)(iii) provides that a permit can be modified upon the "change in
any condition that requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the
permitted discharge." It may be contended that this provision should not be broadly con-
strued as to allow permit changes to reflect improved technology. This interpretation is
supported by analogy to section 306 (d) which provides that any facility, the construction of
which was commenced after enactment of the Amendments, need not meet more stringent
standards of performance during a ten-year period beginning at completion of construction
or during the period of depreciation or amortization of the facility, whichever is first to occur.
However, the significant emphasis in the Amendments (§§ 101-15) on technological research
supports the conclusion that improved technology justifies permit modification.
20. Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425 § 13, 30 Stat. 1152, as amended 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-15
(1964).
21. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 511(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1371
(a) (Supp. H1, 1972). The section reads:
(a) This Act shall not be construed as. . . affecting or impairing the authority
of the Secretary of the Army (A) to maintain navigation or (B) under the Act of
March 3, 1899.
19761
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It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause,
suffer, or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either
from or out of any ship . . . or from shore, wharf, manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any de-
scription whatever . . . into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water. .. And pro-
vided further, That the Secretary of the Army, whenever in the
judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will
not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any material
above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits to be defined
and under conditions to be prescribed by him, provided applica-
tion is made to him prior to depositing such material .*..
While the above section seemingly provides for absolute prohibition
of a discharge, it also enables the appropriate public official to per-
mit certain discharges. The Refuse Act was resurrected in the early
1960's to regulate and curtail pollutional discharges. Cases subse-
quent to the Refuse Act's resurrection liberally interpreted the defi-
nition of refuse to include substances that had value immediately
prior to discharge. The application of the Act was correspondingly
extended beyond actual obstruction to navigation.13 Although
expansively applied, the statute did not cover the discharge of mu-
nicipal sewage.
In 1970, although there were thousands of industrial dischargers
located on the nation's waterways, only 266 permits had been issued
under section 13.24 Late in that year, President Nixon issued an
executive order charging the Army Corps of Engineers with the
responsibility of developing a comprehensive permit program under
section 13.25 As a result of this order, the Army Corps reevaluated
its permit program and announced sweeping changes, including the
issuance of new permits where existing permits had been issued
without adequate consideration of the quality of the effluent. Fi-
nally, in April of 1971, new regulations were adopted and pub-
lished 26
Within sixteen months, the 1972 Amendments were enacted into
22. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1971).
23. See United States v. Standard Oil, 384 U. S. 224 (1966).
24. See Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 HASTINGS L. REv.
782, 788 n.51 (1971).
25. Exec. Order No. 11, 574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (Supp. 1970).
26. 36 F.R. 6564, Apr. 7 1971, 33 C.F.R. § 209.131. For a timely discussion of what the
implication of the new Refuse Act policies would be vis A vis the newly organized USEPA,
and policies up to that point, see, Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A
Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1971), reprinted in 3 ENv. L. REV.
317 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Rodgers].
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law, and the newly created NPDES program was to supersede the
section 13 permit authority under the Refuse Act. Section 402(a)(5)
of the Amendments states, "No permit for a discharge into the
navigable waters shall be issued under section 13 of the Act of
March 3, 1899, after the date of enactment of this title. ' 27 Provisions
were made for the interim period until the effective date of the new
permits
until December 31, 1974, in any case where a permit has been
applied for pursuant to this section, but final administrative dispo-
sition of such application has not been made, such discharge shall
not be a violation of . . .Section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899
28
However, several actions were pending under the Refuse Act on
the date of the enactment of the 1972 Amendments. Senator Mu-
skie, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution
and the major sponsor of the legislation, noted the concern of some
legislators that pending actions under the Refuse Act could be nulli-
fied or dismissed by the above provisions. He stated that such con-
cern was without foundation in light of the Savings Provision which
provided:
"No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or
against the Administrator or any other officer or employee of the
United States in his official capacity . . . shall abate by reason of
the taking effect of the amendment made by . . .this Act.29
He went on to state that "without any question it was the intent of
the Conferees that this provision (the Savings Provision) included
enforcement actions brought under the Refuse Act, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, and any other acts of Congress."3
During debate in the Senate, Senator Robert Griffin expressed
the fear that the "immunity provision," (section 402 k) would moot
the currently pending action against the Reserve Mining Company
of Silver Bay, Minnesota which was discharging 67,000 tons of
asbestos-like materials into Lake Superior daily.3 ' In response to
Senator Griffin's concern, John R. Quarles, Jr. of the General Coun-
sel's office of the USEPA wrote:
27. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(5) (Supp. I, 1972).
28. Id. § 402(K), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(K) (Supp. H, 1972).
29. Id. § 4a, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. , 1972).
30. CONG. REc.: S. Res. 2770, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REC. 16875 (1972).
31. Some of the litigation surrounding Reserve Mining Co. has subsequently been re-
solved. 380 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Minn.), 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974), 418 U.S. 911 (1975).
1976]
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Section 402(k) as you note provides "that until December 31, 1974,
in any case where a permit has been applied for pursuant to this
section . . . such discharge will not be a violation of. . . Section
13." Your concern is that the word "case" can be construed to
render moot all pending litigation. It is my opinion that it is most
unlikely that the language contemplated such a result or that a
court would so interpret the statute. For it is reasonable to con-
clude that the courts will not interpret any legislation to deprive
them of jurisdiction of pending litigation in the absence of clear
and explicit language. There is no clear and explicit language to
this effect in the pending bill."2
Thus, Congressional intent that actions under the Refuse Act shall
be preserved regardless of the immunity provision of section 402(k)
was clearly manifested by the legislative history and explicit
language of section 511.
On the one hand, the integrity and authority of the Refuse Act is
preserved while its core, the permit provision of section 13, is inoper-
ative. The effect of section 402(k) on the long-term viability of the
Refuse Act remains to be seen. However, in United States v. Rohm
and Haas Company,33 the court upheld congressional intent to pre-
serve pending Refuse Act suits. The government brought an action
for continuous discharge3 against a chemical manufacturing plant
which discharged its wastes into the Houston Ship Canal. The lower
court had granted injunctive relief by limiting the discharge of
various contaminants such as ammonia, cyanide, nickel, oil and
grease, chromium, and chemical oxygen demand. The practice of
barging such waste to sea was enjoined. The defendants contended
that the Amendments of 1972 preempted the Refuse Act action, and
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be applied, thereby re-
quiring USEPA to make the initial determination concerning ef-
fluent limitations. The defendants further contended that even if
the Amendments did not preclude the action, they should provide
the basis for the proper standards to be applied to the company's
discharge.
32. CONG. REc. S. Res. 2770, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 16883 (1972).
33. 500 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 962 (1975). Several courts have dealt
with the issue of the effect of the Amendments on pending litigation under the Refuse Act.
See United States v. Ira S. Bushey and Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110, (D. Vt.), aff'd mem.,
487 F.2d 1393 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. Kennebec
Log Driving Co., 356 F. Supp. 344 (D. Me.) vacated and remanded, 491 F.2d 562 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
34. Justice Department policy has been, prior to 1971, to bring actions primarily for spills,
leaks, and accidents as opposed to continuous discharges. For discussion of such early action
see, Rodgers, note 26 supra.
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Arguing preemption, defendants raised the 402(k) "immunity
provision" and stated that they had applied for an NPDES permit.
The court, reviewing the legislative history, determined that the
Savings Provision 5 applied and rejected defendant's contention.
Concerning the primary jurisdiction issue, 8 defendant argued that
the proper forum for the action was an expert administrative body,
the USEPA. In denying this claim, the court stated:
First, the question in this case is not what standard of discharge
EPA may eventually permit, but rather what quantities of in-
dustrial wastes, if any, an equity court should permit a Refuse Act
violator to discharge pending final EPA action on the Company's
application for a permit. 7
Secondly, the court continued, the complex technical issues relate
to the type of relief to be granted-conceivably a complete halt of
defendant's discharge. Such equitable relief, involving even ex-
tremely technical problems, was an appropriate matter for the
courts. The data was not more complex than that which was pre-
sented to the courts in antitrust or patent suits.
The court then narrowly construed the Refuse Act and held that.
any order issued by the lower court was to be modified so as to be
consistent with the terms and conditions of the NPDES permit
when issued. The court cited section 402 (a)(4) which provides:
All permits for discharges into the navigable waters issued pur-
suant to section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899 shall be deemed to
be permits issued under this title, and permits issued under this
title shall be deemed to be permits issued under section 13 of the
Act of March 3, 1899, and shall continue in force and effect for
their term .... 11
The court then ordered the decree effective, only so long as defen-
dants remained in violation of the Refuse Act, i.e. until a final
NPDES permit was issued.
Critical acclaim for the Refuse Act is based on the interpretation
that it totally prohibits the discharge of pollutants. The 1972
Amendments similarly state that by 1985 zero discharge is the na-
tional goal. It is becoming increasingly apparent that, like the May
35. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 4(a) 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(Supp. II, 1972).
36. Primary jurisdiction has been raised in a number of cases dealing with the effects of
the 1972 Amendments. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
37. 500 F.2d at 174-75.
38. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 402(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(4) (Supp. II, 1972).
19761
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30, 1975 Air Quality Standards, 9 1985 will come and go and the
zero discharge goal will not be achieved. 0 The value of the Refuse
Act as a total prohibition on the discharge of pollutants is magni-
fied. Should technology change, or should current standards be
found inadequate, the Refuse Act could once again be resurrected
as a tool of effective enforcement.
Notwithstanding the exclusive preservation of the Refuse Act in
section 511, the Rohm and Haas court has defined a final remedy
in Refuse Act litigation to be contingent upon the ultimate contents
of an NPDES permit. For purposes of section 13 of the Refuse Act,
compliance with the NPDES program is compliance with the Re-
fuse Act. If other courts follow suit, the options for effective enforce-
ment may be crucially diminished. The value of the Refuse Act may
be relegated to the role of supplementing deficiencies in the 1972
Amendments. Such areas of supplementation would include certain
oil spills, instantaneous or short-term discharges, sources which are
not definable as point sources, or solid waste deposits into navigable
waters.4
Prior to the enactment of the Amendments, debate raged over
the most appropriate approach to regulate industrial discharges
short of the absolute prohibition of the Refuse Act. The issuance in
1967, for the first time, of far reaching guidelines for approval of
standards for state water quality improvement was hailed as, at
last, a step toward a concrete technical regulatory framework.2 Al-
though these initial state standards were sometimes misconstrued
or ignored, the first step had been taken on the road to the promul-
gation of effluent standards.
Although the goals and standards of the Amendments are being
met, the pitfalls of mammoth administration, and yet to be discov-
ered hazards, may create a system from which there is little possibil-
ity of legal extrication for at least the decade to come.43 Zero dis-
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c.5 (1970).
40. 6 BNA ENV. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 695-96.
41. Ipsen and Raisch, Enforcement under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 369, 412 (1974).
42. Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, United States Department of the
Interior. Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards for Interstate Waters.
43. Before sounding the death knell for the Refuse Act or singing its praises too highly,
an examination of its enforcement history may be helpful. In 1970, the Justice Department
issued Guidelines for Litigation under the Refuse Act. 1 BNA ENV. REP. CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 288. These guidelines preceded the development of the permit policy in 1971.
The various United States Attorneys were instructed to use the Refuse Act as a prosecutorial
tool against discharges which were accidental, or even infrequent, but not against continuous
ones. The latter type of discharges were to be handled under the then Federal Water Quality
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charge is in some instances an unrealistic goal;" but statutory pro-
vision for absolute prohibition of waste discharges is a useful and
perhaps necessary remedy. The lawmakers of 1899, without the
technological advantages of the lawmakers of 1972, provided the
best enforcement tool to date.
Rationalization about "reasonable amounts" of pollution is not
easily reconciled with a statute which declares it a crime to dump
"refuse of any kind or description whatever" into navigable
waters."
OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Although the Refuse Act remains an effective enforcement tool for
sudden discharges such as oil spills, there is a further enforcement
tool in the Amendments. Section 31146 which addresses oil and haz-
ardous substance liability is the next of the enumerated sections
which are not subject to the "immunity provision" of 402(k). Sec-
tion 311 incorporates and improves upon oil spill and prevention
provisions which were first included in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in 1970."7 Section 311 deals primarily with prevention,
clean up, and liability for clean up costs. Section 311(b)(1) initially
declares that it is the policy of Congress that there be no discharges
of oil or hazardous substances into or upon navigable waters. 8 In
seeming contradiction a following section, 311(b)(3), when states
that the discharge of oil or hazardous substances in harmful
quantities as determined by the President are prohibited. The de-
Control Administration. Additionally, cases were not to be filed against anyone holding a
permit from a state, county, or political subdivision. Nor were suits to be filed against any
discharger participating in an administrative proceeding with the Federal Water Quality
Control Administration. Hindsight tends to show that even the existence of a state permit
tended to discourage other actions. During that period consideration was being given to filing
an action against several pulp mills who had failed to obtain Refuse Act permits. They did,
however, have perfunctory state permits, and the United States Attorney declared that to
prosecute for failure to obtain section 13 Refuse Act permits would clash with the congres-
sional intent that states be the primary actors in the water enforcement field. For a more
detailed discussion of early Refuse Act policy see Rodgers, note 26 supra.
44. The concept of no discharge (or zero discharge) has been met with some consternation
in the Western part of the nation: particularly in the Western "appropriation" states where
process water must be returned to a stream in order that the downstream user will have water
at all.
45. Rodgers, note 26 supra at 785.
46. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(Supp. II, 1972).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1161-1162 (1970).
48. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 311(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1321 (b)(1) (Supp. H1, 1972).
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termination which is to be made by the President includes those
quantities of oils and any hazardous substances "the discharge of
which, at such times, locations, and circumstances, and conditions,
will be harmful to the public health or welfare . .
The enforcement mechanism requires that any person in charge
of a facility causing an oil spill and having knowledge of such spill,
shall notify the United States Government immediately. A violation
of section 311 may result in a $10,000 penalty and imprisonment for
not more than one year. 51
Responsibility for enforcement of these oil spill provisions re-
mains with the United States Coast Guard. Violations shall subject
violators to, at minimum, a civil penalty of not more than $5,000
for each offense. If it is determined that there is an imminent and
substantial threat to the public health or welfare due to an actual
or threatened discharge of oil (or hazardous substance) into a navig-
able water, appropriate relief to abate such a threat may be sought
in a district court of the United States. 51
In addition to the oil spill provision the Administrator of the
USEPA is required to
develop, promulgate, and revise as may be appropriate, regula-
tions designating as hazardous substances, other than oil as de-
fined in this section, such elements and compounds which, when
discharged in any quanity into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States or adjoining shorelines or the waters of the contig-
uous zone, present an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shell-
fish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches.2
Presumably, the substances on this list are subject to the aforemen-
tioned provisions for spill and discharge incidents.
Although the initial provision, section 311(b)(1), ennunciates a no
discharge policy, the actual prohibition relates to discharges in
harmful quantities. It has been suggested that the requirements for
removal of discharges, and installation of spill prevention equip-
ment may be read in the light of this no discharge policy.53 To
reconcile the prohibition of discharges of "harmful quantities" with
an NPDES permit, which clearly allows specified amounts of oils
in a permittee's effluent, is a troublesome problem. The term dis-
49. Id. § 311(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(4) (Supp. H, 1972).
50. Id. § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(5) (Supp. II, 1972).
51. Id. § 311(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
52. Id. § 311(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(2)(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
53. See Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FED. ENV. LAW, (T. Guil-
bert and E. Dolgin, ed. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as ZENsml.
National Permit Program
charge is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying or dumping."54 The presence of oil in a permittee's
effluent could come under the purview of such definition. This par-
ticular question was raised during the congressional debate sur-
rounding the adoption of this section. The administrative comments
of the House Committee on Public Works55 state that this section is
apparently intended to apply primarily to spills. The definition of
discharge would not include any discharge that is in compliance
with an effluent limitation which has been established under section
301, 302, 306, or 307; or is in compliance with a permit issued under
section 402.
House debate addressed the definitional problem in a different
manner, yet arrived at a similar conclusion. The language of the
Conference Report stated:
Notwithstanding the broad definition of "discharge" in subsection
(a)(2) the provisions of this section are not intended to apply to the
discharge of oil from any onshore or offshore facility, which dis-
charge is not in harmful quantities and is pursuant to, and not in
violation of, a permit issued to such facility under section 402 of
this Act.5"
Another speaker (not a conferee) contended that the definition was
not merely limited to spills, but applied to facilities which dis-
charged oil continuously or intermittently, including any manufac-
turer who had in fact obtained a permit under section 402.11
Assuming that Congress did not intend to create an inconsistency,
the language of section 311 is far from clear. That there are provi-
sions for immediate notification, Coast Guard enforcement activity,
and clean-up liabilities indicates that the main thrust of the section
is in the direction of spills and sudden discharges. Presumably,
issued permits would allow oil discharges in less than harmful
quantities. 8 "Harmful quantity" under section 311 may be inter-
preted broadly. 59 Thus, this could produce unfair situations which
54. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 311(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. §
1321 (a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
55. H.R. REP No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1972).
56. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1972).
57. 118 CONG. Rac. H. 9125 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Congressman John D.
Dingell (Mich.).
58. For example, the standard imposed on the oil and grease discharge of a major oil
refinery in the Midwest was 8.6 mg/I as an average and 16.4 mg/l as a maximum.
59. Pursuant to the original oil discharge provisions in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62 (1970), the Secretary of the Interior promulgated regula-
tions defining a harmful quantity as any quantity which will cause a film or sheen upon or
discoloration of the surface of the water. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1974). This definition was upheld
in United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1973). See also 40 C.F.R. § 112.2.
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should be addressed at the permit issuance stage. 0
SECTION 504
A third action which is excluded from the 402(k) "immunity
clause" is section 504, the emergency powers provision, which au-
thorizes the Administrator:
[U]pon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination
of sources is presenting an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons. . . may
bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district
court to immediately restrain any person causing or contributing
to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge of pollutants causing
or contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as
may be necessary.6'
By excluding a section 504 action from 402(k), it seems that Con-
gress intended to make section 504 available where a facility may
be discharging under a permit, yet presenting an imminent hazard
to the public health. Such a precautionary measure is necessitated
by the proclivity of technology to use new methods before consider-
ing potential environmental effects.
It is difficult to prove the imminent danger of some pollutional
discharges. Individual discharges may fall short of the imminent
danger standard; yet in combination with other discharges they
pose a severe threat to the public health. Whether the emergency
provisions will fill the gap in the event of an unsatisfactory yet
permitted discharge remains to be seen.62
OTHER ACTIONS
The Amendments declare a congressional policy "to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution. ... 63 Although
merely a policy statement, it aids in interpretating other sections of
the Amendments. Section 510 of the Amendments guarantees the
right of any state to adopt or enforce standards more stringent than
those required by the Amendments. This section establishes a clear-
60. ZENER, note 53 supra, at 758.
61. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364
(Supp. II, 1972).
62. The Clean Air Act has a similar emergency provision. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-1 (1970). It
has almost never been invoked.
63. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. §
1251(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
64. Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. 11, 1972).
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cut impediment to an NPDES permittee, alleging immunity from
a pollution action. The legislative history of the Amendments
particularly section 510, confirms that states and political subdivi-
sions are guaranteed the right to bring statutory and common law
nuisance actions against NPDES permittees. The House Commit-
tee Report on section 510 reads as follows:
The Committee considers section 510 to be of extreme importance
in assuring the States of the right to adopt or enforce provisions
at least as strict as those established in this legislation. Thus, the
Committee rejected in most instances suggestions for preemption
by the Federal Government and preempted the States only where
the situation warranted it based upon the urgent need for uniform-
ity such as in section 312(f) relating to marine sanitation devices."5
Even absent the clear statutory language of section 510 and its
supportive legislative history, case law exists that provides that
federal legislation shall not be interpreted as preempting state envi-
ronmental enforcement, and that the mere existence of a permit or
administration agency approval will immunize against state en-
forcement. This case law can be placed into two categories: nuisance
actions under federal common or state statutory law (legislative
enactment of the principles of public nuisance); and statutory ac-
tions under state environmental program standards.
Federal Common Law Nuisance
There have been, to date, several federal common law actions
against facilities discharging into navigable waterways. During the
pendency of these actions, these same facilities have been issued,
or have been in the process of adjudicating NPDES permits. Al-
though the cases are few, they may well determine the direction of
the effort to clean the nation's waterways. In each case the dischar-
ger used the existence of an NPDES permit as a mechanism to
delay, or even terminate the common law proceedings.
An early case involves an action brought by the State of Illinois
against the City of Milwaukee for the discharge of sewage into Lake
Michigan. These proceedings gave rise to the landmark decision of
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,"6 which established the right to bring
an environmental action under federal common law. In City of
Milwaukee, the Supreme Court refused to take original jurisdiction
and remanded the case to federal district court wherein defendants
65. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1972).
66. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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sought to dismiss the complaint." The defendants, in support of
their motion to dismiss, argued that the 1972 Amendments pre-
empted the action under federal common law. The district court
noted that prior to the enactment of the 1972 Amendments, similar
arguments were advanced in other cases contending that the right
of states to bring federal common law nuisance actions was
preempted by the earlier versions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. 8 That earlier legislation was also intended by Congress
to create a comprehensive federal water pollution program. Defen-
dant's contention of federal preemption, the court noted, had been
repeatedly rejected in those other cases."9 The Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, both prior to and subsequent to the enactment of
the Amendments, is intended by Congress to place the primary
responsibility on the states to enforce water quality and eliminate
pollution.
In City of Milwaukee, defendants attempted to distinguish the
Amendments from earlier legislation, in that the Amendments pro-
vided for the promulgation of specifically enumerated standards to
ensure water quality, and that particularly, the NPDES program,
because it specified standards, should preclude a common law nuis-
ance action. Defendants' theory was that the doctrines expressed by
the Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of the Amendments,
were decided in a context in which there were no existing standards
having the capability or effect of preempting federal common law.
Aside from noting the intent of Congress to preserve the primary
responsibility of the states in matters of water quality, the court
rejected defendants' contentions on several other grounds. Complex
regulations governing water quality (as opposed to effluent stan-
dards) did exist prior to the Amendments, without preempting an
action based on federal common law nuisance. Secondly, the court
specifically noted that section 510 of the Amendments plainly
showed an intent to preserve other actions, such as federal common
law nuisance actions. Finally, the court stated that had Congress
intended to preclude a particular kind of action by legislation, Con-
gress would have expressly exhibited such an intent. By way of
example, the court pointed out that the Amendments specifically
preempted the area of marine sanitation devices.7 0 Analogously, the
67. People ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. 111.1973).
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1972).
69. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,
401 U.S. 493 (1971); United States v. Bushey, 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
70. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 312(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1322(f)(1).
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opinion points to a similar interpretation placed upon the Clean Air
Act.7' The Supreme Court in Washington v. General Motors Corp.,
stated that a non-statutory remedy is still viable in the absence of
explicit preemption by Congress."
The district court's interpretation in City of Milwaukee, as to the
effect of the 1972 Amendments on federal common law nuisance
actions was followed in United States and People ex. rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp. (Waukegan Works).7 3 United States
Steel, Waukegan Works, discharges its wastewaters directly into
Lake Michigan. Defendants moved to dismiss and based its claim
on several theories. Foremost of these was that the 1972 Amend-
ments preempted state intervention which was predicated upon fed-
eral common law nuisance theory. The court ruled on defendant's
contention although the case was filed twelve days prior to the en-
actment of Amendments. Citing sections 510 (State Authority), 511
(Refuse Act), and 4 (Savings Provision), the court found no provi-
sion in the Amendments which would have effectively abolished the
federal common law of nuisance. Statutes, the court stated, will not
be interpreted to be in derogation of common law absent a clearly
exhibited intent.
In United States Steel, (Waukegan Works) defendants distin-
guished the characteristics of its case from City of Milwaukee in
that the dispute in City of Milwaukee was between sovereigns (or
quasi-sovereigns) who resided in diverse states. The court rejected
defendant's argument and held that Illinois had standing to enforce
federal common law on behalf of its residents against a private
corporation, as well as against another sovereign. Commentators
have suggested,75 quite correctly, that federal question jurisdiction
was not based solely on the diversity of the parties, or the location
of the polluter, but instead on the nature of the protected resource.
Lake Michigan is an interstate body of water, traditionally, a sub-
ject of judicial action in the federal courts.7" The City of Milwaukee
opinion stated that "it is not only the character of the parties that
requires us to apply federal law . . ." and that "[flights in inter-
state streams . . . have been recognized as presenting federal ques-
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et. seq. (1970).
72. Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
73. 356 F. Supp. 556 (N. D. Ill. 1973).
74. Id. at 558, citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
75. Comment, Use of Public Nuisance Theory in Suit by Federal and State Govern-
ments-United States v. United States Steel Corp., 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 795 (1974).
76. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
1976]
Loyola University Law Journal
tions."'77 Thus, it is possible that the United States Steel Corp.
(Waukegan Works) case stands for the proposition that an action
based on federal common law can be brought against a facility by a
complainant located in the same state, so long as the resource or
body of water is interstate in character, giving rise to federal con-
cern, and therefore, federal question jurisdiction.
Where an NPDES permit has been issued to a facility located on
an interstate body of water and such permit contains effluent and
water quality standards less stringent than those of an adjacent
state, it appears that City of Milwaukee holds that regardless of
the issuance of a permit, a federal common law nuisance action
would be preserved under section 510.78 However, assuming that
the facts of United States Steel Corp. (Waukegan Works) arose
after state issuance of a permit a different result may be postulated.
Would a state which issued an NPDES permit be estopped from
bringing an action for nuisance under federal common law because
of its previous approval and issuance of a "license to pollute?" In
such an instance a defendant would argue that the state had pro-
mulgated the permit, had been able to present its position before
an administrative law judge in the event that adjudicatory proceed-
ings on the permit had been held, had been given the opportunity
to voice its objections in a permit appeal process, or had certified
the permit. Defendant would contend that it would be unfair for a
state to bring a federal common law abatement action against a
facility that had been issued a permit to regulate its discharge.
Conceivably such state action would be equitably estopped.
In environmental litigation, courts have estopped state attempts
to revoke permits.7" Although estoppel may be applied in Illinois
against a public entity, it is a doctrine reluctantly invoked, and
never applied so as to impair police powers or power to collect reve-
nues.8 Although it may be argued that the state may be estopped
from revoking a permit for an activity which does not cause a prima
facie adverse impact, estoppel will not be invoked in state attempts
to directly promote health and welfare and exercise traditional con-
cepts of police powers.81
77. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972).
78. Accord, Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 360, 332
N.E.2d 426 (1975).
79. Wachta v. Pollution Control Board, 8 111. App. 3d 436, 289 N.E.2d 484 (1972).
80. Hickey v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 35 1l1. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966).
81. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
The estoppel issue may be obviated by a well-drafted permit. Many permits contain a
provision specifically preserving future state action, usually worded in the following manner:
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States have successfully raised various arguments against the in-
vocation of the estoppel doctrine. In many states several agencies
may take pollution abatement action. Often a defendant will argue
that the activity of one agency is representative of the State and
therefore will estop the regulatory activity of another. In Illinois,
explicit statutory language would indicate the contrary. While the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency may actually issue a
water discharge permit (whether under a state permit program or
NPDES program), the Attorney General may "on his own motion" 2
file an action to enjoin violations of the Environmental Protection
Act, which defines water pollution as
such alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological or
radioactive properties of any waters of the State, or such discharge
of any contaminant into any waters of the State, as will or is likely
to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful or detrimental
or injurious to public health, safety or welfare . . ..
The Attorney General may also file environmental actions pursuant
to chapter 12 of the Illinois Revised Statutes which gives the
Attorney General
the power and authority, notwithstanding and regardless of any
proceeding instituted or to be instituted by or before the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Pollution Control Board any other
administrative agency, to prevent air, land or water pollution
within this State by commencing an action or proceeding in the
circuit court of any county in which such pollution has been, or is
about to be, caused or has occurred, in order to have such pollution
stopped or prevented either by mandamus or injunction."4
A state may also argue from the holding of City of Milwaukee that
the action of a regulatory agency or subdivision is not state action
for purposes of the estoppel doctrine. In City of Milwaukee, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that it was a conflict between
two states insofar as original jurisdiction was concerned. Plaintiff
Illinois argued that the action was one against the State of Wiscon-
sin in that defendants, City of Milwaukee, City of Racine, and the
Metropolitan Sewage Commission of the City of Milwaukee were
Nothing in this permit shall be construed to preclude the constitution of any legal
action or relieve the permittee from any responsibilities, liabilities, or penalties
established pursuant to any applicable State Law or regulation under authority
preserved by § 510 of the Act.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1042(d) (1973).
83. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1002(n) (1973).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 12 (1973).
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instrumentalities of the State of Wisconsin. The Court held that
political subdivisions of a state were "citizens" for diversity pur-
poses and concluded that the term "States" as used in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 5 should not be read to include their politi-
cal subdivisions. This principle was implicitly reiterated in the
case of Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Steel. 7 De-
fendant, United States Steel, invoked the doctrine of primary juris-
diction in an attempt to dismiss or stay the pending proceeding
until the finalization of the adjudicatory hearing which involved the
issuance of its NPDES permit. The court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that plaintiff, the Metropolitan Sanitary District, was a party
to the adjudicatory hearing because it was a political subdivision of
the State of Illinois which, through the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, had intervened in the adjudicatory hearing as an
"affected state." Thus, just as the action of a regulatory agency or
subdivision is not state action for the doctrines of original or pri-
mary jurisdiction, it is also not state action such that would estop
a different agency or subdivision from bringing a pollution abate-
ment action.
A final "anti-estoppel" argument that could be invoked by a state
which has issued or certified a NPDES permit is centered on the
essential character of federal common law nuisance. It is well settled
that an action for abatement of pollutional discharge, based on
common law nuisance by way of injunctive relief, must meet the
standard of imminent irreparable injury, or grave and immediate
danger, or immediate threat to the health of the population.8 The
presumption could be made that a permit, containing technologi-
cally determined standards, issued to a facility operating in compli-
ance with such standards, could not allow the discharge of pollu-
tants which present an imminent hazard to the public health. If this
presumption is correct then necessarily a "permitted" discharge will
never be a defense to a federal common law action. However, the
complex problems of water pollution are not so compartmentally
logical. Technology is unpredictable. Today's permitted discharge
is tommorrow's imminent hazard. To determine the gravity of a
nuisance, a court may draw upon standards utilized by the state in
which the harm occurs, which may be more stringent than the stan-
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970).
86. 406 U.S. at 98 (1972).
87. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 360, 332 N.E.2d
426 (1975). For a more complete discussion of the case see text accompanying note 90 infra.
88. 42 AM. JuR.2d INJUNCnONS § 48 (1969).
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dards permitted in the state where the discharge occurs. Regardless
of the motivation of uniformity in the federal water pollution control
program, one state's discharge standards may be considered a grave
and immediate danger in a downstream state. 9
State Nuisance
Federal common law is not the only source of nuisance actions to
abate water pollution. Although an action for nuisance is rooted in
common law tradition, most states have enacted nuisance statutes.
The Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Steel
Corporation" case was originally brought by the Metropolitan Dis-
trict of Greater Chicago (MSD) in 1969 against United States Steel,
Gary Works. The MSD claimed that the discharge from the Gary
Works into Lake Michigan was presenting a grave danger and im-
mediate threat to the population within the Sanitary District. Spe-
cifically, the action was filed pursuant to its statutory authority
which provides:
The sanitary district has the power and authority to prevent the
pollution of any waters from which a water supply may be obtained
by any city, town or village within the district. The sanitary dis-
trict acting through the general superintendent has the power to
commence an action or proceeding in the circuit in and for the
county in which the district is located for the purpose of having the
pollution stopped and prevented either by mandamus or injunc-
tion. "
The complaint, similar to a common law action for nuisance, sought
injunctive relief to abate the continued pollution of a public water
supply. The extent to which the statutory action for nuisance resem-
bled a common law action was noted by the court:
However, the creation of this statutory authority should not be
viewed as a new or radical innovation in the law of Illinois. In fact,
the right of an individual or a municipality to apply to a court of
chancery for injunctional relief against pollution of a water supply
and the rendition of such relief by the court has been recognized
for many years. In Ruth v. Aurora Sanitary District, 17 ll. 2d 11,
89. For example, in Illinois the water quality standard for ammonia nitrogen is 0.02 mg/l
total ammonia while the federal standard is 0.02 un-ionized ammonia. The Illinois standard
is more stringent in that the 0.02 represents total ammonia in solution, while the federal
standard relates to the un-ionized ammonia fraction which is considered by some experts to
be that portion which is toxic to aquatic biota. The debate between "total" and "toxic
portion" has been extended to a number of chemical contaminants.
90. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Il. App. 3d 360, 332 N.E.2d
426 (1975).
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158 N.E.2d 601, the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction order-
ing trustees of a municipality to abate a nuisance caused by dis-
charge of sewage into a water supply source. This injunction had
been obtained by a private individual and the Court referred to the
action as "abatement of a public nuisance." (17 Ill.2d 11, 17, 158
N.E.2d 601.) To illustrate the venerable age of this principle, we
note that the Court cited Green et al. v. Oakes, 17 Ill. 249. There,
in 1855, the Supreme Court reversed a decree dismissing a suit
seeking to prevent obstruction of a public way. The Court referred
to this as a nuisance and a wrong or invasion of the common right.
Another instance of the recognition of the propriety of injunc-
tional relief to restrain the pollution of a water supply is City of
Northlake v. City of Elmhurst, 12 111. App.2d 190, 190 N.E.2d 375,
citing Barrington Hills Club v. Barrington, 357 Ill. 11, 191 N.E. 239
and other authorities. 2
Subsequent to the filing of the action by MSD, the State of
Illinois, through its Attorney General joined as a party. This inter-
vention was predicated upon two areas of statutory authority. First,
under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act the "Attorney Gen-
eral may . . . on his own motion, institute a civil action for an
injunction to restrain violations of this Act." 3 The second basis for
intervention was the independent authority of the Attorney General
to prevent pollution by commencing an action for injunctive relief. 4
In 1974, subsequent to the issuance of a draft NPDES permit,
defendant filed its motion to alternatively dismiss or stay the pro-
ceedings on the basis that the NPDES adjudicatory hearing was
pending. Defendants believed that the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion authorized a court to stay proceedings pending administrative
disposition of a permit application. This doctrine may apply when
enforcement of a cause requires the resolution of issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special compe-
tence of an administrative body. 5 The purpose of invoking the doc-
trine is the need for administrative skill in deciding technical ques-
tions requiring consistency and uniformity which can only be pro-
vided by the expertise of an administrative agency. The court in
MSD did not apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Although
91. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 42, § 326aa (1973).
92. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 332
N.E.2d at 431 (1975).
93. ILL. REv. STAT. ch 111 V2, § 1042(d) (1973).
94. ILL. REv. STAT. ch 14, § 12 (1973). See text accompanying note 84 supra.
95. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), and United
States v. W. Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
96. Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
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the court recognized that plaintiff and USEPA shared the same
goal, attainment of an unpolluted water supply, since the manner
and method of reaching this goal was entirely different, this differ-
ence precluded the application of the doctrine. In analyzing this
difference, the court emphasized the distinction between the goals
of the permit program, and those of a nuisance action, a distinction
which may prove valuable in future nuisance actions:
The adjudicatory hearings before the federal agency will be con-
cerned with a permit which expressly approves and validates con-
tinued pollution of the water supply until its expiration date of
July 31, 1979. The record does not show precisely what is expected
to follow after the expiration date. However, it seems from the
federal statute that another permit will then be issued in an at-
tempt gradually to eliminate the pollution problem. In complete
contrast, the proceedings before this court are not concerned with
a gradual and permissive elimination of the problem. The gist of
the abatement action is, exactly as its name implies, an attempt
to terminate the pollution, subject only to such essential delays as
may be absolutely necessary and unavoidable. In short, the federal
administrative hearings are concerned with permissive regulation
and the proceedings before us involve total abatement. The pro-
ceedings before us are thus completely divergent from the matter
pending before the administrative body. In a situation of this type,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable. We do not
have here an issue of priority of jurisdiction but we have two tri-
bunals which are approaching a problem from entirely different
points of view and which are attempting to exercise jurisdiction in
two entirely different matters.97
The MSD decision also relied upon congressional intent support-
ing the 1972 Amendments. The court noted that the declared policy
of Congress was to preserve in the states the primary responsibility
to eliminate pollution:
Repeated congressional pronouncements show the continuing in-
tention of Congress not only to perpetuate rights of municipalities,
such as plaintiff, to adopt and enforce requirements to abate pollu-
tion more stringent than any which may be adopted under the
federal system but also to make certain that this activity by states
and municipal corporations, such as plaintiff, continues for the
public benefit. 8
97. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 1ll. App. 3d at 369-70, 332
N.E.2d at 433 (1975).
98. Id. at 368, 332 N.E.2d at 432.
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The court clearly held that actions of states and political subdivi-
sions shall indeed be preserved regardless of the permit process.
State Statutory Action
Many states implemented definitive standards prior to the enact-
ment of the Amendments. The General Assembly of the State of
Illinois, for example, passed the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act in 1970. Action to abate water pollution was based upon the
statutory prohibition that
no person shall cause or threaten or allow the discharge of any
contaminants into the environment in any State so as to cause or
tend to cause water pollution in Illinois."
The definition of water pollution prohibits the discharge of "any
contaminant into any waters of the State, as will or is likely to
create a nuisance."'' 0 Thus, actions under the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act for water pollution were similar to nuisance ac-
tions. In the two years following the enactment of the Illinois Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, specific effluent, and water quality stan-
dards were promulgated. These standards applied to dischargers
into Illinois waterways and provided the basis for enforcement ac-
tion. The Amendments were enacted subsequent to the implemen-
tation of this enforcement program. In some instances the numerical
standards created by the USEPA diverged from those promulgated
by Illinois. In general, Illinois standards were more stringent.
Conflicts might arise because dischargers could potentially be
held accountable to different state standards. If state A has stan-
dards more stringent than federal standards, but adjacent state B
adopts the federal standards, can state A attempt to enforce its
standards against dischargers located in state B and discharging
into a waterway common to both states? On its face, section 510
plainly indicates that state A could enforce those more stringent
standards. No standards respecting discharge of pollutants are ab-
rogated so long as they are not less stringent than those under the
Amendments, nor is any jurisdiction or right of any state to be
affected by the Amendments. If such an event were to occur, the
discharger would presumably defend on several grounds. He could
contend that it is inequitable to submit to state standards, which
are more stringent than the uniform federal ones, because in
complying with NPDES effluent standards he had invested heavily
99. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1012(a) (1973).
100. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1003(h) (1973).
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in a certain type of wastewater treatment or recycle program.'
Further, an estoppel argument could be invoked against an adjacent
state to the same extent that estoppel is invoked against a state
bringing a common law action against a facility for which it has
certified or issued an NPDES permit.0 2 The regulations enacted
pursuant to the NPDES program provide that following receipt of
certification of a given permit, the USEPA must notify any state
whose waters may be affected by the discharge.0 3 Upon such notifi-
cation the affected state may object to such permit and request a
public hearing. The written objection of such state may be included
in the permit, or excluded with reason. In addition, an affected state
may intervene in an adjudicatory hearing conducted in regard to the
issuance of a permit.
As a result, it may be argued that an adjacent state waived its
rights by not participating in the adjudicatory process. Once again
the clear meaning of section 510 would seem to mitigate such a
contention. If a state must participate in the permit process to
preserve its rights, Congress would have explicitly so stated. There
is also a practical consideration. Issuing permits to every point
source in a given state is a massive task. To expect a state to actively
participate in the permit process of another state is a burden that
many state agencies are not equipped to handle.
Finally, there may be a strong distinction between an action
brought to enforce particular water quality and effluent standards,
and an action brought under common law or statutory nuisance.
The distinction drawn in Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States
Steel stated that the permit program is an attempt at gradual and
permissive elimination, while the nuisance action before the court
101. In determinations concerning cost-benefit ratios for pollution removal it has been
theorized that removal of the bulk of contaminants is a modest cost when related to the size
of the economy. However, some experts argue that after a certain percentage of contaminant
removal, costs begin to increase with each additional unit to be removed. For example, it has
been estimated that reduction of BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand-oxygen depleting
bacteria in water) in a meat processing discharge averages six cents per pound up until 90%
removal. Each additional pound removed after that 90% figure may cost up to sixty cents.
Thus, to the discharger a small variation of a standard in a downstream state may represent
significant removal costs. The experts, however, differ on the validity of such a conclusion.
Some would say the more stringent standard is the better one, and additional removal costs
must be borne. Others would contend that the over-all effect on water quality would not be
significant enough to require that additional expenditure. For a complete discussion of the
relative costs of contaminant removal, see, Kneese and Schultz, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (Brookings Institution 1974).
102. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
103. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1341(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1972), 40 C.F.R. 125.41(a).
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was based on total abatement. A state enforcement action could be
based, in addition to nuisance, on numerical limitations to be
achieved by certain compliance dates. Thus, not only the goal, but
also the manner and methods to achieve the goal are identical to
those of the USEPA. The MSD court emphasized that the "manner
and methods" of USEPA, and of plaintiffs were potentially differ-
ent. Perhaps, the issue will be considered differently if the manner
and methods by which plaintiff's goal was to be reached paralleled
those of the USEPA.
REMEDIES
Distinguishing actions to abate pollution on "manner and meth-
ods" as opposed to objectives may yield no real difference. The
intent of the Amendments, the plain language of section 510, and
the cases which have touched on the permit issue, have reinforced
the theory that an action may be brought against a discharger even
though he has obtained or is in the process of obtaining an NPDES
permit representing considerable compliance efforts.
The original action in MSD was filed for "abatement" of pollu-
tion. Injunctive relief seeking abatement does not necessarily mean
turning off the faucet. Abatement may be interpreted as compliance
with certain technological goals and standards. In United States ex
rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp. ,104 the prayer for relief sought
abatement in two forms: a prohibitory injunction which was to pro-
hibit discharges into the waters of Lake Michigan, and a mandatory
injunction requiring the installation of equipment to eliminate the
discharge. The difficulty of enforcing the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948 was in part related to the ambiguous and diffi-
cult process of fashioning a remedy. If the relief sought was complete
and immediate cessation of defendant's discharge by shut-down of
a facility, the balancing of economic factors too often precluded
such an alternative. As a result, the water pollution control offensive
evolved toward the use of numerical standards. °5 Regardless of the
kind of action instituted, the obvious source of a remedy is the
current status of technology which would be reflected by the feder-
ally promulgated discharge standards created as a result of the 1972
Amendments. The few cases that have addressed the permit prob-
lem have exhibited such a trend.
As discussed previously, the remedy in the Rohm & Haas case'06
104. United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
105. See note 42 supra.
106. United States v. Rohm and Haas Company, 500 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974).
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was to be contingent on the limitations set forth in defendant's
NPDES permit.07 .Subsequent to the court's decision preserving an
action under federal common law in United States ex rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp., the parties entered into a consent decree.
The agreement was that the defendant would gradually abate and
eventually eliminate its discharge in accordance with the program
set forth in its pending NPDES permit.
A currently pending case may be instructive on this issue. In 1967,
the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago (MSD) filed
a suit against Inland Steel,0 8 a steel facility located in Indiana,
which discharges its wastewaters into Lake Michigan. In 1972, while
the MSD case was still pending, the Attorney General of Illinois also
filed and the cases were consolidated. 0 9 The intervention of Illinois
was based on that section of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act which allows the Attorney General to file actions for injunctive
relief to halt pollution."0 Finding the defendant's discharge to con-
stitute a nuisance and to be in continued violation of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act, the court fined Inland $1,905,000.
On the issue of actual abatement of the discharge the court noted
that it did not have the scientific expertise to prescribe the precise
abatement program required. It referred to a similar problem con-
fronted in Wilmington Chemical Corp. v. Celebreeze in which that
court said: "The Court is also loathe to substitute its judgment for
the expertise of the administrative official charged with the duty of
passing on the subject."'
The Inland court stated that abatement methods should be the
responsibility of the defendants, and set forth "compromise figures"
based on effluent limitations that defendant was to meet. At the
107. Rohm and Haas was a Refuse Act case. During the enactment of the Amendments
the issue of fashioning remedies under the Refuse Act was discussed. A statement made by
the Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York was included in
the record of the House debate. It dealt with criticism of the Refuse Act because no standards
had been written into it. He stated that although there were no cases dealing directly with
the problem of lack of standards, a prosecutor does in effect deal with standards which were
characterized as the "maximum feasible abatement under the present technology." He indi-
cated that the above was precisely the goal of the USEPA, when evaluating permit applica-
tions. House Debate on HR 11896, p.689.
108. The Metropolitan San. Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Inland Steel Co., 67-CH-5682
(Cir. Ct., Cook Co. Ill. September 8, 1975).
109. People ex rel. Scott v. Inland Steel Co., 72-CH-259 (Cir. Ct., Cook Co., Illinois,
September 8, 1975).
110. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1042 (1973). See text accompanying note 82 supra for a
discussion of this section.
111. The Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Inland Steel Co., 67-CH-5682
(Cir. Ct., Cook Co. Ill. September 8, 1975).
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same time this decision was handed down, Inland Steel and the
USEPA were involved in settlement discussions regarding the stan-
dards to be contained in the company's NPDES permit. When the
opinion was issued, USEPA suspended discussion and publicly
stated that its final position on the subject permit would be reserved
until after the completion of the litigation."' The interdependency
of permit issuance and court decision-making is notable.
In the Metropolitan San. Dist. v. United States Steel Corp."
decision, the court, in rejecting the application of primary jurisdic-
tion, relied on a Florida case, State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa Electric
Company,'" in which the court held that the trial court wrongly
applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In a nuisance action,
the Shevin court stated, it is historically a judicial function to make
the determination as to what activity constiutes a nuisance, a deter-
mination not always dependent on technologically based data.
"[A] given activity can constitute a judicially abatable nuisance
notwithstanding full compliance with either legislative mandate or
administrative rule.""' 5 The court then addressed the problem of
practicalities in the context of a remedy:
[Ilf there are any practicalities involved which should be con-
sidered in the light of present technology limitations, they inhere
in the equities involved; and regardless of their potentially techni-
cal nature they more properly ought to be taken into account by
the trial court in the mandate of any injunctive relief deemed
warranted."'
Although actions based upon common law, statutory nuisance, or
environmental standards may be brought against a permittee, the
practical effect is a heavy reliance on current technological pro-
grams of water pollution abatement. The courts need look no further
than the presently constituted NPDES program.
CONCLUSION
This article has not been concerned with a substantive examina-
tion of the Amendments and the NPDES program created thereun-
der. But the soundness and viability of the Amendments penetrate
to the heart of the problem addressed. The thesis is that regardless
of convincing estoppel and jurisdictional arguments, a permittee
112. Chicago Sun Times, Sept. 12, 1975, at 8, col. 3.
113. 30 Ill. App. 3d 360, 332 N.E.2d 426 (1975).
114. State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa Electric Company, 291 So. 2d 45 (Fla. App. 1974),
cert. denied 297 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1974).
115. Id. at 48.
116. Id.
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operating in compliance with the requirements of the NPDES pro-
gram, may still be brought to task for such a discharge through
several different modes of action. Ability to utilize a variety of legal
actions is necessary to the survival of effective environmental en-
forcement. The preservation of those actions, however, may be a
legal fiction. When the time comes to fashion a remedy, a massive
federally developed uniform program for discharge control cannot go
unnoticed. When ordering injunctive relief in a nuisance situation,
the courts must balance the "conveniences" in regard to both par-
ties."7 Does the abatement of the continued activities constituting
a nuisance represent a greater harm to the perpetrator than its
continuation does to the complainant? When the effluent standards
promulgated under the NPDES program were being developed,
complex cost benefit analyses were used. A court need search no
further in its quest for an effective standard to measure the eco-
nomic impact of an abatement program. Even though most permits
have only three to five-year terms, the direction of NPDES will
pervade this nation's efforts to clean its waterways for at least a
decade to come.
117. 42 Am. JUR.2d INJUNCTIONS § 55 (1969).
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